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Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004–2008, this
study empirically tests the impact of family control, institutional environment and their
interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. Our results indicate that (1)
family ﬁrms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than
non-family ﬁrms; (2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a signiﬁcant posi-
tive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed com-
panies; and (3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is
stronger in family ﬁrms than in non-family ﬁrms. Somewhat surprisingly, we ﬁnd that con-
trolling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem I (the owner–manager
conﬂict) rather than Agency Problem II (the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder
conﬂict), and thus have a signiﬁcant negative impact on cash dividend policy. In contrast,
a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role
in mitigating Agency Problem I and encouraging family ﬁrms to pay cash dividends.
 2011 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Mounting evidence shows that family ﬁrms are prevalent around the world and occupy an important position in the eco-
nomic sphere (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003a).1 In recentnal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
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ructure of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of
shareholder protection, such as the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States, ﬁrms across the world
minant form of controlling ownership is family ownership. Similarly, Claessens et al. (2000) show that
es are controlled by families, and Facio and Lang (2002) ﬁnd that the proportion in Western Europe is
ized by dispersed ownership, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) report that 34% of S&P500 companies can be
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family ﬁrms. A possible explanation is that the special features of control rights in family ﬁrms provide a unique per-
spective for corporate governance research. On one hand, as an internal corporate governance mechanism, family con-
trol may bring about more effective management and supervision, and thus lead to lower owner–manager agency
costs than in non-family ﬁrms. On the other hand, the moral risks arising from the abuse of control rights by large
shareholders (including family shareholders) is potentially more serious, and expropriation by large shareholders has
become a prominent agency problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Whether these advantages and disadvantages of
family control equate to a net governance beneﬁt or cost in family ﬁrms is an open question. Prior literature suggests
that family control has an important impact on many aspects of listed companies, such as corporate performance
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Amit et al., 2009), diversiﬁcation
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003b), cost of debt ﬁnancing (Anderson et al., 2003), effectiveness of the board of directors
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004) and information disclosure (Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2009).
Unfortunately, there are few studies that focus on whether and how family control affects the dividend policy of listed
companies.
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000a) incorporate the law into corporate governance research, and reveal the important
impact of legal origins on investor protection and corporate governance. La Porta et al. (2000b) empirically ﬁnd that
stronger minority shareholder rights are associated with a higher dividend payout, which conﬁrms the ‘‘outcome mod-
el’’ of dividends. Following this work, scholars have conducted in-depth cross-country studies on the relationship be-
tween the legal environment and corporate dividend policy (Faccio et al., 2001; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Bartram
et al., 2008; Brockman and Unlu, 2009). This strand of literature can be termed as cross-country comparative analysis,
and assumes that the differences in institutional environment across regions of the same country can be ignored. How-
ever, this assumption is clearly inconsistent with the reality in China, a large developing country with an economy in
transition. In fact, a survey by Fan et al. (2007) and the World Bank (2006) concludes that there are large institutional
gaps across Chinese provinces, including the process of marketization and the investment climate, due to regional dif-
ferences in history, natural environment, regional development and social culture. In other words, the impact of differ-
ences in regional institutional environment on corporate behavior, including the dividend policy of listed companies,
should not be simply ignored.
Inspired by these two streams of literature, we aim to determine the impact of family control, institutional environment
and the interaction between them on the cash dividend policies of Chinese listed companies. This study is deeply embedded
in the special background of China, where family businesses are playing an increasingly important role as a result of the re-
form of the initial public offering (IPO) regulations and the privatization of state-controlled listed companies (Xia, 2008).
These changes mean that the impact of the external environment on the corporate behavior of listed companies is potentially
greater in the emerging and transitional market of China than in Western countries. This study is signiﬁcant in that it pro-
vides an important basis for improving the corporate governance of listed companies and promoting China’s market-ori-
ented reforms.
This study makes three main contributions. First, from the perspective of family control, we provide new evidence
of the impact of large shareholders on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. The literature both at home and
abroad pays little attention to the relationship between family control and dividend policy, and this study thus pre-
sents some of the ﬁrst evidence in this area. In addition, past studies on Chinese ﬁrms suggest that large shareholders
have a strong motivation to distribute cash dividends so that they can turn untradeable shares into cash in this dis-
guised form before their shares can be traded freely (Yuan, 2001; Chen et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2009; Lee and Xiao,
2004), and that dividend policy is designed to cater to the demands of large shareholders rather than minority share-
holders (Huang and Shen, 2007). However, we document that as a speciﬁc type of controlling shareholder, family
shareholders avoid paying high cash dividends, which suggests that large shareholders have heterogeneous preferences
for dividend policy.
Second, we examine the governance effect of the regional institutional environment, thereby extending existing
cross-country studies to encompass a more microscopic perspective. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000a,b) argue that
differences in legal origins across countries have important effects on corporate behavior. Based on this logic, we investigate
differences in regional institutional environments (including the process of marketization and the investment climate) in
China, and their impact on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. We ﬁnd that in China, the largest emerging and
transitional country in the world, the quality of the regional institutional environment has a signiﬁcant effect on the dividend
policy of listed companies, which conﬁrms and enriches the ‘‘outcome model’’ of dividends proposed by La Porta et al.
(2000b).
Third, the literature ignores possible connections between different corporate governance mechanisms. Here, we incor-
porate family control and the institutional environment, which are internal and external governance mechanisms, respec-
tively, into a uniﬁed analytical framework, thereby deepening our understanding of the interaction between different
corporate governance mechanisms. The results show that family ﬁrms have a higher cash dividend payout ratio and propen-
sity to pay dividends in better institutional environments, as a good institutional environment helps to weaken the
‘‘entrenchment effect’’ of family control and thus encourages family ﬁrms to distribute cash dividends. Our results indicate
that a favorable external environment improves the effectiveness of internal corporate governance, suggesting a close inter-
action between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.
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2.1. Cash dividend policy and two kinds of agency problems
In the literature on corporate governance and dividend policies, researchers usually focus on two kinds of agency prob-
lems.2 The traditional agency theory of dividend policy was developed by relaxing the assumption of no divergence between
the interests of management and shareholders, which is one of the essential assumptions made by Miller and Modigliani
(1961) in their ‘‘dividend irrelevance proposition.’’ The main idea behind this is that the existence of information asymmetry
and the impossibility of complete contracting inevitably cause a conﬂict of interest between shareholders (the principal) and
management (the agent) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Cash dividend payments reduce free cash ﬂow and force management
to enter the capital market for ﬁnancing, thus exposing them to strict external monitoring by the market. Thus, cash divi-
dends alleviate Agency Problem I (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). The traditional agency theory on dividend
policy thus emphasizes the conﬂict of interest between managers and shareholders, and conﬁnes its research objectives to
ﬁrms with dispersed ownership in just a few countries such as the United States and United Kingdom, consistent with the
Berle and Means (1932) paradigm. However, with the rise of the ‘‘law and ﬁnance’’ paradigm, recent cross-country studies
document that concentrated ownership by large controlling shareholders is the dominant form of ownership structure in
most countries, and that the attendant Agency Problem II of expropriation by large shareholders is the main agency problem
around the world (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Holderness, 2009). Several represen-
tative studies have been published within this context that show that strong investor protection laws help to encourage
listed companies to distribute cash dividends and alleviate expropriation by insiders to some extent, thus protecting the
interests of investors (La Porta et al., 2000b; Faccio et al., 2001; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Brockman and Unlu, 2009). Com-
pared with the developed Western capital markets, China, as an emerging and transitional economy, has a long way to go to
improve its regulation of listed companies. The literature indicates that the dividend policy of Chinese listed companies is
deeply imbedded in the special institutional environment of China and is the result of the coexistence of both types of agency
problems.
Quite a few studies by domestic researchers conﬁrm that dividend payments can alleviate Agency Problem I, which is
caused by excess free cash ﬂow. Lv and Wang (2002) ﬁnd that cash dividend payouts are negatively related to managerial
ownership. They argue that the interests of management and shareholders converge as managerial ownership increases,
thereby weakening the effect dividend payments have on reducing agency costs. Yang and Shen (2004) investigate the
market reaction to cash dividend announcements and ﬁnd that the payment of cash dividends can reduce agency costs in
companies with more free cash ﬂow. Liao and Wan (2005) reach a similar conclusion, that over-invested ﬁrms experience
a larger price appreciation than under-invested ﬁrms around dividend increase announcement events, which indicates that
agency theory is applicable in China. However, many other researchers argue that cash dividends may be used as an impor-
tant vehicle for tunneling by large shareholders (Lee and Xiao, 2004). Before the reform of untradeable shares, a large pro-
portion of the shares owned by large shareholders were untradeable, and dividend payments were one of the most
important ways for large shareholders to obtain a return on their investment. In such circumstances, high dividend pay-
ments are more likely to beneﬁt the interests of large shareholders rather than minority investors. For example, Yuan
(2001) shows that controlling shareholders in China divert funds from ﬁrms through cash dividend payments, and that listed
companies may waste the cash obtained from stock dividends rather than maximizing the interests of shareholders. A case
study of Fo Shan Zhao Ming by Chen et al. (2003) documents that high cash dividends do not necessarily enhance a ﬁrm’s
value if the dividend policy leads to expropriation from minority shareholders. Lee and Xiao (2004) argue that controlling
shareholders tend to give up subscription rights and use receipts from rights offerings to pay cash dividends, thereby essen-
tially selling a portion of their untradeable shares to minority shareholders. Similarly, Chen et al. (2009) indicate that Chinese
companies may use high dividend payments to divert the proceeds from an IPO or rights issue into the pockets of controlling
shareholders, and their empirical results support this hypothesis.
The coexistence of two kinds of agency problems in Chinese listed companies leads to many anomalies in dividend policy.
Li (1999) summarize several distinct characteristics of dividend policy in China, such as a low dividend payout ratio, an
increasing number of non-payment ﬁrms, many forms of dividend payments, changeable and unstable dividend payouts
and other irregular behavior. These anomalies have been roundly criticized for a long time, and have attracted attention from
regulators, who have taken various measures to encourage listed companies to pay reasonable dividends to investors. There
is no doubt that studies on the dividend policies of listed companies are a great challenge and an issue of practical impor-
tance, especially in China where the institutional environment is distinct and full of complex factors.
Corporate governance, which can be seen as a series of institutional arrangements to address the issues arising from the
separation of ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), plays a critical role in corporate dividend policy. Several
interesting questions on the relationship between family control and corporate governance present themselves, such as
the impact of family control (an internal governance mechanism) and institutional environment (an external governance
mechanism) on the dividend policy of listed companies, and the role, from the perspective of agency theory, that family2 Following Villalonga and Amit (2006), we refer to the classic owner-manager conﬂict described by Berle and Means (1932) or Jensen and Meckling (1976)
as Agency Problem I and the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder conﬂict as Agency Problem II.
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analysis of these issues.
2.2. Family control and cash dividend policy
According to agency theory, two kinds of agency problems co-exist in family ﬁrms, which makes it difﬁcult to draw con-
clusions about the theoretical relationship between family control and cash dividend policy.
In terms of Agency Problem I, family control seems to play two different roles. On one hand, family shareholders have a
greater incentive to monitor managers and bring about more effective management, which is usually referred to as the ‘‘con-
vergence effect.’’ Compared with other investors, family shareholders have a longer investment horizon and more undiver-
siﬁable investment risk (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a,b; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). As a result, family shareholders are more
willing to focus on the company’s long-term performance and participate in company management, and their relatively con-
centrated ownership of the company ensures that they have a strong voice in the ﬁrm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1986). Family shareholders can thus alleviate agency conﬂicts between owners and managers either by serving
as company leaders or by monitoring the managers.3 However, family control may also intensify Agency Problem I, resulting
in an ‘‘entrenchment effect.’’ Due to a lack of effective supervision, family shareholders, as the insiders in the company, may
have increased access to the use of corporate resources, which increases agency costs and leads to low dividend payments.
This phenomenon is particularly serious in family ﬁrms that go public through a reverse merger (also known as ‘‘back-door
listing’’). In addition, uncompetitive family members who occupy leading positions in family ﬁrms may also impair corporate
efﬁciency, or even damage corporate value. In this case, family control may intensify the owner–manager conﬂict and exert a
negative effect on dividend policy.
In terms of Agency Problem II, family shareholders may use their controlling position in the ﬁrm to extract private ben-
eﬁts at the expense of minority shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the main agency problem in most coun-
tries is the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder conﬂict, rather than the owner–manager conﬂict. Johnson et al.
(2000) deﬁne the transfer of assets and proﬁts out of ﬁrms for the beneﬁt of their controlling shareholders as ‘‘tunneling,’’
which includes transfer pricing that is advantageous to controlling shareholders, excessive executive compensation, dilutive
share issues and insider trading. In China, funds occupation, related party transactions and loan guarantees are the most
common tunneling methods used by large shareholders. The tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders seriously harms
the interests of minority shareholders, one consequence of which is lower dividend payments, because companies are unable
to distribute high cash dividends when corporate resources are being used for other purposes. Faccio et al. (2001) suggest
that the predominant form of ownership in East Asia is family control, and that companies have a lower payout ratio in Asia
than in Europe because corporate insiders tend to choose to invest in projects with low or negative returns that give them
opportunities for expropriation. The Research Center of Shanghai Stock Exchange (2005) points out that private listed com-
panies in China are usually controlled by families, which run high moral risks in engaging in expropriation. Liu and Liu
(2007) conﬁrm this view, and ﬁnd a close link between ﬁnancial irregularities and expropriation in family ﬁrms in China.
Because of these dual agency conﬂicts, it is difﬁcult to judge whether and how family control affects corporate dividend
policy, which is largely an empirical question. Hu et al. (2007) and Cesari (2009) study listed companies in the United States
and Italy, respectively, and ﬁnd that the payout ratio of family ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly lower than that of non-family ﬁrms. Con-
versely, Schmid et al. (2010) and Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) reach the opposite conclusion, ﬁnding that family ﬁrms are more
willing to pay dividends than other ﬁrms. In China, according to the statistics of Hu (2002), listed family ﬁrms pay signiﬁ-
cantly lower dividends than non-family ﬁrms. Similarly, Bradford et al. (2009) show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are
more generous in their dividend payments than private companies. In the special institutional circumstances of China, SOEs
have an advantage in procuring external ﬁnancing and are subject to preferential policies because of the ‘‘soft budget con-
straint’’ (Lin and Li, 2004).4 Relatively speaking, family ﬁrms and privately controlled ﬁrms in general in China pay lower
dividends than SOEs, because the former are more constrained in obtaining external equity and debt, and ceteris paribus,
depend more on internal equity to ﬁnance growth (Bradford et al., 2009). Based on this discussion, we propose Hypothesis
1 as follows.
H1: Cash dividends are lower among family ﬁrms than non-family ﬁrms.
2.3. Institutional environment and cash dividend policy
Compared with other corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure, independent directors, informa-
tion disclosure, independent auditors, market for executives and mergers and acquisitions market, the institutional
environment is a more inherent governance mechanism (Xia and Fang, 2005). In recent years, a large number of cross-coun-3 Note that the ‘‘convergence effect’’ of family control may weaken the motivation of family ﬁrms to pay cash dividends. According to agency theory, cash
dividend payment is an important means of reducing the owner-manager conﬂict (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). As family shareholders help to strengthen
corporate management and the supervision of managers, family ﬁrms need to pay less cash dividends to reduce the costs of Agency Problem I.
4 Lu and Yao (2004) point out that the non-state sector’s contribution to the GDP of China is more than 70%, yet surprisingly the non-state sector obtained
less than 20% of the total ofﬁcial bank loans granted in the past few years, with the remaining 80% going to the state-owned sector.
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rights and thus corporate behavior, including dividend policy. Testing a cross-section of 4000 companies from 33 countries
with different legal origins, La Porta et al. (2000b) ﬁnd that dividends are higher in common law rather than in civil law juris-
dictions, which suggests that higher cash dividend payments are the ‘‘outcome model’’ of better legal protection of investors.
This view is supported by a series of other cross-country studies. Faccio et al. (2001) report that listed companies pay higher
dividends in Europe than in Asia, a phenomenon that they attribute to the stronger investor protection offered by European
legislation. Bartram et al. (2008) ﬁnd that investors in countries with better legal protection can use legal rights to obtain
dividends to reduce agency costs. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) suggest that in countries with weak shareholder protection,
the value of ﬁrms is higher when controlling managers pay dividends. Brockman and Unlu (2009) show that country-level
creditor rights inﬂuence dividend policies around the world, with both the probability and amount of dividends paid out
being signiﬁcantly lower in countries with weaker creditor rights. They argue that the agency costs of debt play a more deci-
sive role in determining dividend policies than the previously documented agency costs of equity.
These cross-country studies assume that regional differences in the institutional environment inside a country are insig-
niﬁcant. However, although this may be appropriate for a small country or a country with balanced regional development, it
is unlikely to be applicable to China. China began its transition from a centrally planned system to a market economy in
1978, and the ensuing market-oriented reforms have resulted in decisive progress but also a widening regional disparity
within the country (especially in terms of economic development in the southeastern coastal provinces versus the western
regions). Some macroeconomic evidence conﬁrms this view. There are huge differences in institutional environment across
provinces in areas such as the process of marketization and investment climate that cannot simply be ignored (Fan et al.,
2007; World Bank, 2006). If the legal origins of countries have a signiﬁcant impact on corporate dividend policy (La Porta
et al., 2000b), then from a more microscopic perspective we can expect that regional differences in the institutional environ-
ment within a country should also have a key effect on dividend policy.
According to the literature on law and ﬁnance, a favorable regional institutional environment helps to protect minority
shareholders and encourages listed companies to distribute cash dividends. A possible explanation is that in regions with
stronger investor protection, companies face more ﬁerce market competition in terms of products, factors, labor and capital.
Moreover, companies in better regional institutional environments are also supervised by relatively sound legal systems and
monitored by more professional government agencies. The governance effect of the external environment works well in at
least two respects. First, a favorable institutional environment monitors managers and encourages them to maximize cor-
porate value. In a competitive market environment, managers must do their best to improve corporate management and
economic performance just to survive and earn a good reputation, and companies must subject themselves to supervision
by the market to prevent them from distributing excessive cash ﬂow to shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984). Second, a favorable
institutional environment reduces expropriation from minority shareholders and protects the interests of outside investors.
In a good institutional environment with sound legal systems, tunneling behavior is effectively curbed, as the marginal costs
of transferring proﬁts to controlling shareholders greatly increase and expropriation is more likely to be exposed and pun-
ished. Furthermore, sound legal systems help to prevent self-dealing behavior, such as outright theft from the ﬁrm, excessive
compensation, or the issuance of additional securities to management and their relatives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), there-
by reducing the ‘‘entrenchment effect’’ created by insiders (including family shareholders).
Accordingly, a favorable regional institutional environment is expected to assist in mitigating the two kinds of agency
problems and encourage companies to distribute excess cash ﬂows to outside shareholders. In a sense, as an important
external corporate governance mechanism, the institutional environment plays an essential and vital role in dividend policy
and the protection of minority shareholders. However, in China, the positive effect of the institutional environment on cash
dividends is probably weaker in SOEs than in family ﬁrms. In fact, the behavior of SOEs (including their dividend policy) is to
a great extent determined by administrative orders from higher authorities or the needs of local government agencies.5 In
addition, the appointment and appraisal of managers in SOEs seems to be conducted through the structure of the adminis-
tration. Undoubtedly, the governance effect of the market-oriented institutional environment on SOEs and their managers is
weakened by administrative intervention, because neither market mechanisms nor the legal system work as effectively as in
non-SOEs. The decisions of family ﬁrms are much more affected by the external institutional environment. Given these dif-
ferences, we expect that all listed ﬁrms, and especially family ﬁrms, will be more willing to pay cash dividends in regions
with a better institutional environment. Based on this theoretical analysis, we propose Hypotheses 2 and 3 as follows.
H2: The better the regional institutional environment, the higher the cash dividends of listed companies.
H3: The impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family ﬁrms than in non-family
ﬁrms.5 For example, Chen et al. (2003) ﬁnd that the high cash dividends paid for years by Fo Shan Zhao Ming were to a great extent determined by local
government, rather than market behavior. In China, when the ﬁscal revenue of local governments is relative strained, listed companies controlled by the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) are usually required to pay enormous cash dividends to prop up local
governments, regardless of the high costs of doing so.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variables Symbol Deﬁnitions
Propensity to pay cash dividend Cdumdiv Equals 1 if the company pays cash dividends, and 0 otherwise
Cash dividend payout ratio Cpayout Cash dividend per share divided by earnings per share
Cdyield Cash dividend per share divided by the year-end share price
Family control Family Equals 1 if the company is controlled by a family, and 0 otherwise
Institutional environment Market The marketization index provided by Fan et al. (2007), where the higher the value of the
variable Market, the faster the process of regional marketization and the better the regional
institutional environment
Invest The investment climate index, which is set to 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively, according to the
ranking of China’s six regions by the World Bank (2006), where the higher the value of the
variable Invest, the better the institutional environment of the provinces in a region
Firm size Size Natural logarithm of total assets
Financial leverage Lev Ratio of total debt to total assets
Proﬁtability Roa Ratio of net income to total assets
Investment opportunities Tobin’s Q Ratio of (stock price  number of tradable shares + net assets per share  number of non-
tradable shares + book value of liability) to total assets
Cash holdings Cash Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets
Maturity Lnage Natural logarithm of ﬁrm age since founding
SEO regulations Dumroe Equals 1 if the company’s ROE is between 6% and 7%, and 0 otherwise
Year effects Year Four year dummy variables set for the ﬁve-year sample period
Industry effects Ind Twenty industry dummy variables are set according to the Industry Classiﬁcation Standard
announced by the CSRC, excluding the ﬁnancial industry
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3.1. Sample selection and data sources
We choose all listed companies in the Chinese A-share market for the period 2004–2008 as the original sample. The sam-
ple selection process is as follows: (1) ﬁnancial companies are excluded because of the special nature of the ﬁnancial indus-
try; (2) companies whose ultimate controllers are missing or not known are excluded; (3) ﬁrst-year IPO ﬁrms are excluded to
eliminate IPO effects; (4) loss companies that still pay dividends are excluded; (5) to minimize the inﬂuence of outliers, the
top and bottom 1% of the continuous ﬁnancial variables are winsorized. In total, we have 5463 ﬁrm-year observations from
1486 unique companies for the period 2004–2008. The ﬁnancial data and corporate governance data are all obtained from
the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database and the Wind.NET information terminal. The institu-
tional environment indices are taken from Fan et al. (2007) and the World Bank (2006).3.2. Variables and models
3.2.1. Variable descriptions
Table 1 contains summary descriptions of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Three sets of variables merit fur-
ther explanation. The ﬁrst set are the key dependent variables, which include the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity
to pay dividends. Following Fama and French (2001) and DeAngeloa et al. (2006), we use a dummy variable Cdumdiv to mea-
sure the probability of paying cash dividends. Speciﬁcally, Cdumdiv equals 1 if the company pays cash dividends, and 0 other-
wise. We construct two measures of corporate payouts: cash dividend per share divided by earnings per share (Cpayout) and
cash dividend per share divided by the year-end share price (Cdyield).
The second set of variables are the test variables, namely, Family and Institutional Environment. The dummy variable
Family is employed to represent family control, and equals 1 if the company is controlled by a family, and 0 otherwise.
Following Su and Zhu (2003), Ding et al. (2008), and Amit et al. (2009), we deﬁne a family ﬁrm as a ﬁrm whose largest
ownership stake can be traced back to an individual, a family, or a team of co-founders or their family members. Family
companies are identiﬁed according to the information on the ultimate controller in the CSMAR Database and corporate
annual reports.
Following Amit et al. (2009), we employ two alternative measures of Institutional Environment. The ﬁrst measure is the
marketization index (Market), which is taken from the NERI Index of the Marketization of China’s Provinces: 2006 Report
(Fan et al., 2007). The report constructs a marketization index of Chinese provinces using principal components analysis
based on ﬁve aspects: ‘‘relationship between government and market,’’ ‘‘development of non-state-owned economy,’’
‘‘degree of product market development,’’ ‘‘degree of element market development,’’ and ‘‘development of market interme-
diaries and legal environment system.’’ We also use the marketization index provided by Fan et al. (2007) as a proxy for insti-
tutional environment. The higher the value of Market, the faster the process of regional marketization and the better the
regional institutional environment. As the marketization index is relatively stable for various regions and across years,
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environment of Chinese provinces over the sample period.6
The second measure of institutional environment is Invest, which is based on the World Bank (2006) ranking of 30 Chi-
nese provinces according to their investment climate. Using a survey of 12,400 ﬁrms from 120 cities in China, the World
Bank (2006) report determines investment climate by an index that captures the city’s characteristics, local government efﬁ-
ciency and progress in constructing a harmonious society. Based on this index, the World Bank (2006) ranks China’s regions
from best to worst as follows: (1) Southeast (Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong), (2) Bohai (Shandong, Bei-
jing, Tianjin, and Hebei), (3) Central (Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi), (4) Northeast (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaon-
ing), (5) Southwest (Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, and Hainan), and (6) Northwest (Shanxi, Shaanxi,
Neimenggu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu, and Xinjiang). The ranking does not include Tibet. Amit et al. (2009) argue that the
ranking of investment climate can be viewed as a measure of regional institutional efﬁciency in China. Accordingly, for
the aforementioned six regions, the variable Invest is set to 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. The higher the value of Invest,
the better the institutional environment of the provinces in a region.
The third set of variables are the control variables. Following the literature on corporate payout policy (Fama and French,
2001; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Jensen et al., 1992; Fenn and Liang, 2001; John et al., 2008), we control for several ﬁrm char-
acteristics in our empirical analysis: ﬁrm size (Size), ﬁnancial leverage (Lev), proﬁtability (Roa), investment opportunities (To-
bin’s Q), cash holdings (Cash) and maturity (Lnage). Additionally, we also control for industry and year effects by adding
corresponding dummy variables. It is worth noting that the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has strict rules
for seasoned equity offerings (SEO) by listed companies, which could affect corporate dividend policy. For example, the
‘‘Administrative Measures on Securities Issues of Listed Companies’’ released by the CSRC on May 6, 2006 requires that a
listed company shall not make an SEO unless its weighted average ROE in the three most recent ﬁscal years is not less than
6%. In this special context in China, a large number of listed companies pay cash dividends just to meet the requirements for
raising additional capital in the stock market, as dividend distribution helps to increase their ROE. To control for listed com-
panies’ incentives to meet this regulatory threshold, we add a dummy variable Dumroe in our analysis. As the ROE is likely to
be slightly larger than 6% if a company has tried to manipulate it by paying cash dividends, Dumroe is set to 1 if the com-
pany’s ROE is between 6% and 7%, and 0 otherwise.73.2.2. Research models
There are two kinds of dependent variables in our empirical analysis: the dummy variable, Cdumdiv, and the continuous
variables, Cpayout and Cdyield. Following Brockman and Unlu (2009), we employ the following logistic regression and Tobit
regression models to test our hypotheses.6 The
robustn
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0 otherLogit ðCdumdivÞ ¼ aþ b1 Familyþ b2 Institutional Environment þ
Xn
i¼3
ciCVi þ e ð1ÞTobit ðCpayout j CdyieldÞ ¼ aþ b1 Familyþ b2 Institutional Env ironment þ
Xn
i¼3
ciCVi þ e ð2ÞLogit ðCdumdivÞ ¼ aþ b1 Familyþ b2 Institutional Environmentþ b3 Family Institutional Env ironmentþ
Xn
i¼4
ciCVi þ e
ð3ÞTobit ðCpayout j CdyieldÞ ¼ aþ b1 Familyþ b2 Institutional Env ironment þ b3 Family Institutional Env ironment
þ
Xn
i¼4
ciCVi þ e ð4Þwhere a is the intercept, bi and ci are the regression coefﬁcients of the test variables and the control variables, respectively,
and e is the residual error. We use the White (1980) adjustment to control for heteroskedasticity. The deﬁnitions of Cdumdiv,
Cpayout, Cdyield, Family, and Institutional Environment are provided in Table 1, and CV includes all of the control variables
presented in Table 1. Models (1) and (2) are used to examine Hypotheses 1 and 2 on the impact of family control and the
institutional environment on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. In Models (3) and (4), the interaction term Fam-
ily  Institutional Environment is added to test Hypothesis 3 to examine whether the impact of the regional institutional envi-
ronment on cash dividends is stronger in family ﬁrms than in non-family ﬁrms.main reason why we do so is that Fan et al. (2007) provide data for the marketization index across various regions in China from 2001 to 2005 only. In
ess tests, we test the subsamples in 2004 and 2005 and our main results remain unchanged.
alternative method of setting Dumroe is used in the sensitivity analysis, where it is set to 1 if a company’s ROE is between 5% and 7% (or 6% and 8%), and
wise. The results are similar to those presented here. We thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments on this matter.
Table 2
Distribution of family ﬁrms during the period 2004–2008.
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Number of listed companies 1135 1199 1300 1314 1314 6321
Number of family ﬁrms 245 277 354 380 404 1660
Proportion of family ﬁrms 21.59% 23.10% 27.23% 28.92% 29.42% 26.26%
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
N Mean Median Min. Max. SD Q1 Q3
Cdumdiv 6321 0.46464 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 0.49879 0.00000 1.00000
Cpayout 6320 0.22439 0.00000 0.00000 14.28571 0.47468 0.00000 0.36229
Cdyield 6321 0.00816 0.00000 0.00000 0.14523 0.01358 0.00000 0.01199
Family 6321 0.26262 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 0.44009 0.00000 1.00000
Market 6321 7.35361 7.52000 1.55000 9.81000 1.88757 5.76000 9.36000
Invest 6281 4.29868 5.00000 1.00000 6.00000 1.75442 3.00000 6.00000
Size 6320 21.36687 21.31354 18.67574 24.76032 1.10339 20.65293 22.02584
Lev 6319 0.56996 0.53520 0.07706 3.01233 0.36582 0.39514 0.65999
Roa 6321 0.04678 0.04880 0.35481 0.32077 0.09158 0.02359 0.08390
Tobin’s Q 6320 1.50635 1.20033 0.79457 6.55881 0.88119 1.04098 1.59415
Cash 5956 0.13141 0.10787 0.00171 0.51056 0.10094 0.05943 0.17635
Lnage 6316 2.36386 2.39790 0.00000 3.91202 0.36962 2.07944 2.63906
Dumroe 6321 0.05695 0.00000 0.00000 1.00000 0.23177 0.00000 0.00000
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4.1. Descriptive statistics
The distribution of family ﬁrms during the period 2004–2008 is reported in Table 2. Note that the proportion of family
ﬁrms has followed an upward trend in the past ﬁve years. In 2004, the proportion of family companies in the Chinese A-share
market was about 21.6%, which increased to 29.4% by the end of 2008. This proportion of family ﬁrms in China is close to the
34% for the US S&P500 index (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a), but is lower than the 44.3% for Western Europe and 40% for East
Asia (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Claessens et al., 2000). There is no doubt that family ﬁrms are playing an increasingly important
role and have become an integral part of the Chinese capital market.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis. The mean of Dumdiv is 46.5%, indicating that
about half of the listed companies in China pay cash dividends. Cpayout is 22.4% on average, indicating that less than a quar-
ter of net proﬁt is used to pay cash dividends. The mean of Cdyield is only 0.8%, which means that the cash dividend yield is
signiﬁcantly lower than the one-year ﬁxed deposit rate (about 2–4%). Overall, this analysis indicates that the cash dividend
payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of Chinese listed companies is low. Table 3 also shows large differences in the
quality of the institutional environment across the various regions of China. For example, the maximum and minimum
scores for the marketization index (Market) are 9.81 and 1.55, the former being about six times higher than the latter. Sim-
ilarly, the descriptive statistics for investment climate (Invest) across regions show obvious differences. In short, it is clear
that the institutional environment across China’s provinces is very uneven, and cannot be ignored when researching the cash
dividend policy of listed companies.4.2. Group tests
To further investigate how family control and the institutional environment inﬂuence the cash dividend policy of listed
companies, we conduct a group test (t-test) by splitting the sample into four subgroups (see Table 4).8 The results of the
group test provide statistical support for all of the hypotheses. Speciﬁcally, family ﬁrms pay more cash dividends than
non-family ﬁrms, listed companies registered in regions with a better institutional environment pay more cash dividends,
and the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family ﬁrms than in non-family
ﬁrms.
Taking the group test of Cdumdiv in Panel A of Table 4 as an example, in the High Market (Low Market) subgroup, the
proportion of cash dividend payers in family ﬁrms is about 43.3% (24.9%), whereas the proportion of non-family ﬁrms that
pay dividends is 57.0% (45.9%), the latter ﬁgure being 1.32 (1.84) times higher than the former. This analysis shows that non-
family ﬁrms and ﬁrms located in a favorable regional environment are more willing to pay cash dividends, and that the bet-
ter the regional institutional environment, the smaller the differences in cash dividend payments between family ﬁrms and8 We also use a non-parametric test (the Mann–Whitney rank sum test) and obtain similar results.
Table 4
Group tests of cash dividend policy (difference in means tests).
Marketization index (Market) Investment climate (Invest)
High Low High vs. low t-test High Low High vs. low t-test
(A) Group test of Cdumdiv
Family ﬁrms 0.433 (N = 823) 0.249 (N = 837) 8.065*** 0.424 (N = 907) 0.242 (N = 732) 7.886***
Non-family ﬁrms 0.570 (N = 2102) 0.459 (N = 2559) 7.632*** 0.552 (N = 2526) 0.461 (N = 2116) 6.202***
Total 0.532 (N = 2925) 0.407 (N = 3396) 9.986*** 0.518 (N = 3433) 0.405 (N = 2848) 9.045***
Family vs. non-family t-test 6.768*** 10.933*** 6.647*** 10.647***
(B) Group test of Cpayout
Family ﬁrms 0.184 (N = 823) 0.094 (N = 837) 5.027*** 0.188 (N = 907) 0.080 (N = 732) 5.910***
Non-family ﬁrms 0.284 (N = 2102) 0.231 (N = 2558) 3.582*** 0.274 (N = 2526) 0.234 (N = 2115) 2.635***
Total 0.256 (N = 2925) 0.197 (N = 3395) 4.916*** 0.251 (N = 3433) 0.195 (N = 2847) 4.668***
Family vs. non-family t-test 5.524*** 6.952*** 4.945*** 7.148***
(C) Group test of Cdyield
Family ﬁrms 0.007 (N = 823) 0.003 (N = 837) 7.764*** 0.007 (N = 907) 0.003 (N = 732) 8.041***
Non-family ﬁrms 0.010 (N = 2102) 0.009 (N = 2559) 3.090*** 0.010 (N = 2526) 0.009 (N = 2116) 2.765***
Total 0.009 (N = 2925) 0.007 (N = 3396) 5.267*** 0.009 (N = 3433) 0.007 (N = 2848) 5.435***
Family vs. non-family t-test 6.140*** 10.850*** 6.192*** 10.828***
Notes: N is the number of observations.
⁄ Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed).
⁄⁄ Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed).
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cash dividend policy provide initial support for our hypotheses.4.3. Correlation analysis
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix of the main variables. Market is strongly correlated with Invest, with an average
correlation coefﬁcient of about 0.90, indicating a high consistency between the two proxy variables for institutional environ-
ment. To control for multicollinearity, Market and Invest are examined separately in our regression analysis. The proxy vari-
ables for cash dividend policy, Cdumdiv, Cpayout and Cdyield, are negatively correlated with Family at the 1% level and
positively correlated with Market and Invest at the 1% level, which are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. Additionally,
Cdumdiv, Cpayout and Cdyield are signiﬁcantly correlated with the main control variables Size, Lev, Roa, Tobin’s Q, Cash, Lnage
and Dumroe. The correlations between the test variables and the control variables are all less than 0.40, which means that
multicollinearity is not a concern for the regression analysis.4.4. Regression results
In this section, we report the results of the regression analysis. Table 6 reports the logistic regression and Tobit regression
results for the full sample. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the regression coefﬁcient of Family is signiﬁcantly negative at the
1% level in all six regressions, conﬁrming that family ﬁrms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay
dividends than non-family ﬁrms in China. We argue that this provides new evidence on the impact of large shareholders
on corporate cash dividend policy. Past studies by domestic researchers suggest that large shareholders have a strong moti-
vation to distribute cash dividends so that they can turn untradeable shares into cash in this disguised form before their
shares can be traded freely (Yuan, 2001; Chen et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2009; Lee and Xiao, 2004). However, the results of
this study document that family shareholders are a particular type of controlling shareholder that tend to avoid paying high
cash dividends. In other words, the relationship between large shareholders and corporate dividend policy cannot be gen-
eralized. Our empirical results suggest that different kinds of large shareholders have heterogeneous preferences for corpo-
rate dividend policy.
According to Table 6, Market and Invest are positively and signiﬁcantly associated with Cdumdiv, Cpayout, and Cdyield at
the 1% level in all of the regressions, indicating that a favorable institutional environment has a positive impact on corporate
cash dividend policy, which veriﬁes Hypothesis 2. At the national level, La Porta et al. (2000b) ﬁnd that legal origin has a
signiﬁcant impact on corporate dividend policy, and that a higher cash dividend payment is the ‘‘outcome model’’ of better
legal protection of investors. However, their cross-country study ignores differences in the regional institutional environ-
ment inside a country, something this study contributes beyond their work. We conﬁrm and enrich the ‘‘outcome model’’
of dividends proposed by La Porta et al. (2000b) from a more microscopic perspective by investigating the impact of regional
differences in institutional environment on corporate dividend policy in China. We ﬁnd that the institutional environment
(the process of marketization and the investment climate) affects corporate decision making.
Table 5
Correlation matrix.
Cdumdiv Cpayout Cdyield Family Market Invest Size Lev Roa Tobin’s Q Cash Lnage Dumroe
Cdumdiv 0.939*** 0.939*** 0.149*** 0.111*** 0.117*** 0.390*** 0.237*** 0.500*** 0.082*** 0.240*** 0.178*** 0.086***
Cpayout 0.507*** 0.950*** 0.171*** 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.340*** 0.259*** 0.418*** 0.117*** 0.225*** 0.184*** 0.088***
Cdyield 0.645*** 0.484*** 0.167*** 0.108*** 0.114*** 0.393*** 0.249*** 0.498*** 0.183*** 0.221*** 0.193*** 0.082***
Family 0.149*** 0.108*** 0.147*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.251*** 0.072*** 0.001 0.149*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.012
Market 0.123*** 0.066*** 0.073*** 0.035*** 0.912*** 0.093*** 0.034*** 0.064*** 0.027** 0.113*** 0.163*** 0.021
Invest 0.122*** 0.057*** 0.074*** 0.025** 0.882*** 0.088*** 0.038*** 0.067*** 0.033*** 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.022*
Size 0.390*** 0.148*** 0.333*** 0.257*** 0.096*** 0.087*** 0.099*** 0.245*** 0.372*** 0.060*** 0.033*** 0.014
Lev 0.236*** 0.145*** 0.176*** 0.121*** 0.011 0.024* 0.172*** 0.218*** 0.032** 0.303*** 0.147*** 0.036***
Roa 0.396*** 0.135*** 0.308*** 0.035*** 0.059*** 0.052*** 0.236*** 0.288*** 0.204*** 0.211*** 0.055*** 0.037***
Tobin’s Q 0.092*** 0.086*** 0.193*** 0.140*** 0.005 0.016 0.339*** 0.291*** 0.108*** 0.027** 0.132*** 0.033***
Cash 0.207*** 0.104*** 0.128*** 0.062*** 0.113*** 0.101*** 0.003 0.252*** 0.222*** 0.084*** 0.141*** 0.039***
Lnage 0.178*** 0.096*** 0.174*** 0.072*** 0.143*** 0.067*** 0.047*** 0.157*** 0.063*** 0.137*** 0.122*** 0.026**
Dumroe 0.086*** 0.035*** 0.047*** 0.012 0.018 0.023* 0.013 0.047*** 0.023* 0.035*** 0.022* 0.021*
Notes: The upper half is the Pearson correlation matrix and the lower half is the Spearman rank correlation matrix.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed).
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Table 6
Regression results for the full sample.
Logit (Cdumdiv) Tobit (Cpayout) Tobit (Cdyield)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family 0.340*** (4.12) 0.323*** (3.92) 0.097*** (5.71) 0.092*** (5.41) 0.003*** (4.57) 0.003*** (4.33)
Market 0.145*** (7.42) 0.029*** (7.19) 0.001*** (6.04)
Invest 0.141*** (7.02) 0.029*** (6.88) 0.001*** (5.84)
Size 0.924*** (19.79) 0.923*** (19.83) 0.127*** (16.82) 0.127*** (16.89) 0.007*** (19.47) 0.007*** (19.71)
Lev 3.202*** (15.41) 3.191*** (15.36) 0.613*** (15.10) 0.612*** (15.13) 0.025*** (15.61) 0.025*** (15.57)
Roa 19.580*** (18.60) 19.581*** (18.68) 2.285*** (19.54) 2.289*** (19.68) 0.157*** (24.55) 0.157*** (24.65)
Tobin’s Q 0.414*** (5.18) 0.421*** (5.33) 0.085*** (6.81) 0.087*** (7.04) 0.007*** (12.42) 0.007*** (12.75)
Cash 1.747*** (4.34) 1.829*** (4.53) 0.383*** (5.12) 0.392*** (5.25) 0.013*** (4.31) 0.014*** (4.41)
Lnage 1.067*** (10.18) 1.024*** (9.80) 0.180*** (8.67) 0.171*** (8.32) 0.008*** (9.05) 0.007*** (8.83)
Dumroe 0.786*** (5.82) 0.800*** (5.87) 0.166*** (6.65) 0.168*** (6.72) 0.007*** (6.70) 0.007*** (6.77)
Year and Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 17.094*** (17.00) 16.713*** (16.64) 2.144*** (12.46) 2.068*** (12.012) 0.119*** (15.79) 0.116*** (15.50)
v2 1094.58 1101.80
F 58.09 58.79 51.86 51.17
Pseudo R2 0.340 0.339 0.232 0.232 0.343 0.340
N 5950 5912 5949 5911 5950 5912
Notes: The t-values are adjusted using the heteroskedasticity adjustment approach of White (1980).
⁄ Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed).
⁄⁄ Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed).
Table 7
Regression results for subsamples.
Logit (Cdumdiv) Tobit (Cpayout) Tobit (Cdyield)
(1) (2) (3)
High Low v2
test
High Low v2 test High Low v2 test
(A) Sample split by market
Family 0.212* (1.83) 0.502***
(4.07)
2.92* 0.057**
(2.57)
0.146***
(5.46)
6.48** 0.001 (1.43) 0.005***
(5.07)
9.32***
Size 0.969*** (14.47) 0.878***
(13.31)
0.94 0.114*** (11.73) 0.141***
(11.92)
3.28* 0.006*** (14.37) 0.007***
(13.69)
4.88**
Lev 3.651***
(11.76)
2.921***
(9.68)
2.84* 0.667***
(12.07)
0.595***
(9.37)
0.73 0.026***
(12.24)
0.026***
(9.93)
0.00
Roa 18.633***
(12.14)
21.113***
(14.16)
1.34 1.918*** (11.67) 2.649***
(15.30)
9.37*** 0.140*** (16.82) 0.175***
(17.71)
7.47***
Tobin’s
Q
0.362***
(3.69)
0.514***
(3.99)
0.89 0.097***
(6.81)
0.079***
(3.63)
0.51 0.006***
(10.24)
0.007***
(7.59)
0.51
Cash 0.963* (1.73) 2.683*** (4.41) 4.37** 0.209** (2.22) 0.593*** (4.88) 6.22** 0.006* (1.66) 0.021*** (4.05) 5.23**
Lnage 1.043***
(6.96)
1.027***
(6.85)
0.01 0.155***
(5.83)
0.199***
(6.07)
1.08 0.007***
(6.25)
0.008***
(5.98)
0.49
Dumroe 0.741*** (3.80) 0.816*** (4.13) 0.07 0.151*** (5.83) 0.171*** (4.63) 0.15 0.006*** (4.58) 0.007*** (4.59) 0.18
(4) (5) (6)
(B) Sample split by invest
Family 0.168 (1.56) 0.531***
(3.97)
4.37** 0.046**
(2.16)
0.160***
(5.34)
9.85*** 0.001 (0.87) 0.007***
(5.34)
16.00***
Size 0.993*** (16.54) 0.848***
(12.55)
2.31 0.127*** (12.90) 0.136***
(10.24)
0.32 0.007*** (17.66) 0.007***
(13.02)
0.02
Lev 3.587***
(12.10)
2.814***
(8.49)
3.14* 0.686***
(12.59)
0.569***
(7.92)
1.82 0.027***
(12.48)
0.025***
(8.64)
0.22
Roa 19.025***
(17.00)
21.094***
(16.02)
0.93 1.999*** (12.18) 2.715***
(12.71)
8.71*** 0.142*** (20.55) 0.181***
(19.87)
8.63***
Tobin’s
Q
0.339***
(3.60)
0.531***
(4.54)
1.27 0.080***
(4.99)
0.093***
(4.22)
0.23 0.006***
(8.55)
0.008***
(8.23)
3.21*
Cash 1.137** (2.24) 3.088*** (4.90) 5.32** 0.238*** (2.60) 0.644*** (5.07) 6.48** 0.008** (2.33) 0.021*** (4.20) 3.86**
Lnage 0.969***
(7.11)
1.040***
(6.21)
0.11 0.155***
(6.22)
0.193***
(5.36)
0.76 0.007***
(6.99)
0.008***
(5.42)
0.31
Dumroe 0.624*** (3.53) 0.949*** (4.70) 1.39 0.140*** (4.14) 0.189*** (4.51) 0.98 0.006*** (4.44) 0.007*** (4.36) 0.53
Notes: The industry and year dummies, intercepts and explanatory power of the regression models are not reported due to space limitations.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed).
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Table 8
Family control, institutional environment and cash dividend policy.
Logit (Cdumdiv) Tobit (Cpayout) Tobit (Cdyield)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family 0.859** (2.50) 0.873*** (3.84) 0.317*** (4.53) 0.264*** (5.44) 0.013*** (4.85) 0.010*** (5.51)
Market 0.126*** (5.55) 0.022*** (4.59) 0.001*** (3.32)
Family Market 0.068 (1.57) 0.029*** (3.25) 0.001*** (3.86)
Invest 0.110*** (4.76) 0.021*** (4.20) 0.001*** (3.11)
Family  Invest 0.122*** (2.62) 0.037*** (3.82) 0.002*** (4.26)
Size 0.925*** (19.79) 0.925*** (19.83) 0.128*** (16.88) 0.128*** (16.95) 0.007*** (19.53) 0.007*** (19.77)
Lev 3.210*** (15.43) 3.214*** (15.44) 0.618***
(15.15)
0.620***
(15.24)
0.025***
(15.69)
0.026***
(15.73)
Roa 19.592*** (18.60) 19.630*** (18.67) 2.274*** (19.42) 2.278*** (19.57) 0.157*** (24.51) 0.157*** (24.62)
⁄⁄Tobin’s Q 0.414*** (5.18) 0.424*** (5.36) 0.086*** (6.85) 0.088*** (7.12) 0.007***
(12.42)
0.007***
(12.80)
Cash 1.764*** (4.37) 1.847*** (4.57) 0.385*** (5.13) 0.390*** (5.22) 0.013*** (4.32) 0.014*** (4.38)
Lnage 1.051*** (10.00) 1.001*** (9.58) 0.173*** (8.35) 0.164*** (7.97) 0.007*** (8.67) 0.007*** (8.45)
Dumroe 0.776*** (5.75) 0.782*** (5.74) 0.162*** (6.52) 0.163*** (6.55) 0.006*** (6.56) 0.007*** (6.58)
Year and Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 17.005***
(16.91)
16.662***
(16.57)
2.108***
(12.26)
2.050***
(11.92)
0.117***
(15.64)
0.115***
(15.41)
v2 1090.72 1097.20
F 56.19 56.84 50.12 49.56
Pseudo R2 0.341 0.340 0.234 0.234 0.345 0.342
N 5950 5912 5949 5911 5950 5912
Notes: The t-values are adjusted using the heteroskedasticity adjustment approach of White (1980).
⁄ Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed).
40 Z. Wei et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 29–46The ﬁnancial characteristic variables Size, Roa and Cash have a positive impact on cash dividend policy, whereas Lev, To-
bin’s Q and Lnage have a negative effect. As expected, the regression coefﬁcient of Dumroe is signiﬁcantly positive at the 1%
level in all of the regressions, indicating that listed companies have a strong motivation to pay cash dividends to meet the
requirement for SEOs.
We next split the full sample into two subsamples according to the quality of regional institutional environment to form a
High-Market (High-Invest) subsample and a Low-Market (Low-Invest) subsample. We then study the impact of family control
on corporate cash dividend policy in these different institutional environments and report the results in Table 7.
Table 7 shows that family control in China has a negative effect on cash dividend policy across the subsamples. However,
this negative effect is particularly strong when the regional institutional environment is relatively poor, with the regression
coefﬁcients of Family having smaller absolute values and a lower signiﬁcance level in the High-Market and High-Invest subs-
amples. The v2 tests show that the differences in the regression coefﬁcients of Family in each of the two subsamples are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level in all of the regressions. This empirical research on the subsamples not only veriﬁes the
results of the group tests, but also shows that the impact of family control on cash dividend policy is affected by the external
institutional environment. To be speciﬁc, a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive role in corporate
governance by encouraging listed companies to distribute cash dividends and by weakening the negative impact of family
control. However, family control has a decisive inﬂuence on corporate cash dividend policy when the regional institutional
environment is poor.
Table 8 shows the empirical results for the models that test Hypothesis 3. Market and Invest are signiﬁcantly positively
correlated with all of the dependent variables, again conﬁrming the ‘‘outcome model’’ of dividends. Similar to Table 6, the
regression coefﬁcient of Family is signiﬁcantly negative in the various regressions. The main focus is on the interaction term
Family  Institutional Environment, which serves to investigate the role that the regional institutional environment plays in
the relationship between family control and corporate cash dividend policy. Except for regression (1), the regression coefﬁ-
cients of Family Market and Family  Invest are positive at a statistical signiﬁcance level of 1% in all of the regressions. The
results are robust across the two measures of institutional environment, indicating that the impact of regional institutional
environment on cash dividends is stronger for family ﬁrms than for non-family ﬁrms, thus conﬁrming Hypothesis 3. In other
words, the favorable institutional environment helps to promote listed companies, and especially family ﬁrms, to distribute
cash dividends. Moreover, the empirical results for the interaction term Family  Institutional Environment also reveal the
governance effect of the external environment on the effectiveness of internal family control, showing that there are close
connections across different corporate governance mechanisms, which are ignored in many previous studies. We argue that
although China’s emerging and transitional market is not yet mature, with the promotion of market-oriented reforms and
improvement of the external environment, a favorable institutional environment is playing an increasingly important role
in corporate governance and is becoming a strong driving force regulating corporate behavior and improving the capital
market.
Table 9
Level of funds occupation and cash dividend policy: test of the roles of family control and institutional environment.
Logit (Cdumdiv) Tobit (Cpayout) Tobit (Cdyield)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Family 0.334***
(3.03)
0.394***
(3.60)
0.376***
(3.43)
0.091***
(3.88)
0.101***
(4.38)
0.097***
(4.15)
0.003***
(3.19)
0.003***
(3.60)
0.003***
(3.44)
Accratio 9.395***
(8.86)
20.284***
(4.87)
13.935***
(5.37)
2.136***
(9.22)
5.202***
(5.69)
3.628***
(6.08)
0.086***
(9.03)
0.204***
(5.03)
0.137***
(5.41)
Family  Accratio 1.287 (0.66) 12.789** (2.39) 3.868 (0.96) 0.273 (0.58) 1.732 (1.19) 0.414 (0.33) 0.012 (0.69) 0.060 (1.06) 0.006 (0.14)
Market 0.101*** (3.89) 0.015*** (2.91) 0.000** (2.00)
Market  Accratio 1.396*** (2.66) 0.391*** (3.47) 0.015*** (3.05)
Family  Accratio Market 1.397**
(2.01)
0.165 (0.95) 0.005 (0.75)
Invest 0.106*** (3.97) 0.017*** (3.09) 0.001** (2.51)
Invest  Accratio 0.989* (1.81) 0.322*** (2.67) 0.011** (2.16)
Family  Accratio  Invest 0.408 (0.51) 0.002 (0.01) 0.002 (0.29)
Size 0.820*** (17.23) 0.799*** (16.51) 0.797*** (16.50) 0.108*** (14.22) 0.101*** (13.05) 0.101*** (13.12) 0.006*** (17.34) 0.006*** (16.38) 0.006*** (16.57)
Lev 2.693***
(11.81)
2.686***
(11.65)
2.666***
(11.51)
0.532***
(12.01)
0.514***
(11.60)
0.513***
(11.58)
0.022***
(12.66)
0.021***
(12.24)
0.021***
(12.19)
Roa 19.145***
(17.71)
19.132***
(17.39)
19.199***
(17.32)
2.075*** (16.95) 2.038*** (16.53) 2.047*** (16.66) 0.151*** (23.10) 0.150*** (22.75) 0.151*** (22.86)
Tobin’s Q 0.372***
(4.56)
0.375***
(4.55)
0.385***
(4.68)
0.075***
(5.89)
0.074***
(5.83)
0.076***
(6.04)
0.006***
(11.81)
0.006***
(11.78)
0.006***
(12.11)
Cash 1.781*** (4.28) 1.562*** (3.71) 1.655*** (3.93) 0.351*** (4.69) 0.320*** (4.27) 0.330*** (4.44) 0.012*** (3.93) 0.011*** (3.61) 0.012*** (3.74)
Lnage 0.832***
(7.95)
0.925***
(8.74)
0.880***
(8.35)
0.129***
(6.29)
0.142***
(6.94)
0.133***
(6.56)
0.006***
(6.99)
0.006***
(7.42)
0.006***
(7.19)
Dumroe 0.718*** (5.31) 0.725*** (5.29) 0.734*** (5.33) 0.148*** (5.99) 0.147*** (6.00) 0.148*** (6.05) 0.006*** (6.13) 0.006*** (6.14) 0.006*** (6.17)
Year and Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
v2 1063.13 1099.22 1098.70
F 54.81 52.15 52.26 48.46 45.90 45.21
Adj. R2 0.355 0.362 0.360 0.250 0.257 0.256 0.360 0.365 0.361
N 5924 5924 5886 5923 5923 5885 5924 5924 5886
Notes: The t-values are adjusted using the heteroskedasticity adjustment approach of White (1980). The intercepts are not reported due to space limitations.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed).
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Table 10
Overhead expense ratio and cash dividend policy: test of the roles of family control and institutional environment.
Logit (Cdumdiv) Tobit (Cpayout) Tobit (Cdyield)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Family 0.121 (0.88) 0.172 (1.26) 0.163 (1.21) 0.044 (1.58) 0.046* (1.66) 0.045* (1.66) 0.002* (1.66) 0.002* (1.79) 0.002* (1.83)
Msr 4.258***
(6.48)
2.569 (1.18) 1.672 (1.25) 0.862***
(6.47)
1.122** (2.27) 0.650** (2.15) 0.039***
(6.85)
0.029 (1.44) 0.019 (1.51)
Family Msr 2.803* (1.95) 8.278** (2.17) 8.649***
(3.14)
0.581** (1.99) 2.581***
(3.04)
2.230***
(3.57)
0.015 (1.29) 0.104***
(3.07)
0.085***
(3.47)
Market 0.147*** (4.69) 0.020*** (3.30) 0.001*** (3.11)
Market Msr 0.238 (0.78) 0.034 (0.52) 0.001 (0.50)
Family Msr Market 0.755* (1.66) 0.251*** (2.68) 0.011*** (3.05)
Invest 0.158*** (4.78) 0.025*** (3.82) 0.001*** (3.59)
Invest Msr 0.608* (1.83) 0.046 (0.68) 0.005 (1.59)
Family Msr  Invest 1.381*** (2.71) 0.358*** (3.33) 0.016*** (3.69)
Size 0.850*** (18.00) 0.825*** (17.15) 0.826*** (17.20) 0.118*** (15.42) 0.110*** (14.17) 0.110*** (14.26) 0.006*** (18.03) 0.006*** (17.07) 0.006*** (17.30)
Lev 3.342***
(15.00)
3.357***
(14.81)
3.357***
(14.76)
0.664***
(15.40)
0.646***
(15.00)
0.645***
(15.01)
0.027***
(15.79)
0.026***
(15.37)
0.026***
(15.37)
Roa 19.777*** (18.21) 19.778*** (17.88) 19.853*** (18.08) 2.153*** (17.52) 2.108*** (17.04) 2.117*** (17.28) 0.156*** (23.80) 0.154*** (23.44) 0.155*** (23.68)
Tobin’s Q 0.378***
(4.54)
0.380***
(4.49)
0.391***
(4.66)
0.074***
(5.86)
0.074***
(5.84)
0.077***
(6.11)
0.006***
(11.92)
0.006***
(11.87)
0.006***
(12.29)
Cash 1.692 *** (4.09) 1.494*** (3.58) 1.579*** (3.77) 0.361*** (4.77) 0.337*** (4.49) 0.346*** (4.62) 0.012*** (3.96) 0.012*** (3.76) 0.012*** (3.85)
Lnage 0.933***
(8.89)
1.009***
(9.51)
0.959***
(9.10)
0.157***
(7.58)
0.166***
(8.01)
0.157***
(7.66)
0.007***
(8.19)
0.007***
(8.41)
0.007***
(8.20)
Dumroe 0.774*** (5.77) 0.761*** (5.65) 0.774*** (5.70) 0.160*** (6.42) 0.157*** (6.33) 0.158*** (6.40) 0.006*** (6.57) 0.006*** (6.50) 0.006*** (6.56)
Year and Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
v2 1067.32 1086.94 1092.26
F 55.02 51.60 52.09 49.08 46.12 45.79
Adj. R2 0.344 0.351 0.351 0.236 0.243 0.243 0.348 0.352 0.350
N 5935 5935 5897 5935 5935 5897 5935 5935 5897
Notes: The t-values are adjusted using the heteroskedasticity adjustment approach of White (1980). The intercepts are not reported due to space limitations.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% levels (two-tailed).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% levels (two-tailed).
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The foregoing empirical results suggest that family ﬁrms pay less cash dividends than non-family ﬁrms, and that a favor-
able regional institutional environment helps to encourage family ﬁrms to distribute cash dividends. This raises two ques-
tions that deserve further attention. The ﬁrst is why family ﬁrms are more reluctant to pay cash dividends, and the second is
how the institutional environment inﬂuences the dividend policy of family ﬁrms. To answer these questions, we attempt to
uncover the motivation behind the cash dividend policy of family ﬁrms from the perspective of Agency Problems I and II, and
further investigate the role of the institutional environment in these problems.
There are two possible explanations for the low cash dividend payment of family ﬁrms based on agency theory. From the
perspective of Agency Problem II, family shareholders may use their controlling position to extract private beneﬁts, like any
other large shareholder. Such tunneling behavior destroys corporate value and leads to low cash dividend payments. In
China, occupying funds is considered to be one of the most prevalent tunneling methods used by large shareholders (Jiang
and Yue, 2005). We thus explore whether family control intensiﬁes Agency Problem II and reduces cash dividend payments
from the perspective of funds occupation.9 The other possible explanation relates to Agency Problem I. In reality, controlling
family shareholders, acting as insiders, may freely squander corporate wealth due to a lack of effective supervision, and the
occupation of leading positions by unserviceable family members usually reduces corporate efﬁciency. Thus, family control
may increase the costs of Agency Problem I and result in low cash dividend payments.
Following the literature on corporate governance, we investigate the impact of family control on the two kinds of agency
conﬂicts, and thus cash dividend policy, by using the variables Accratio and Msr to measure the level of funds occupation by
large shareholders and the overhead expense ratio of the company, respectively. Accratio is a proxy for Agency Problem II,
and is measured as other accounts receivables over total assets.10 Msr, which is a proxy for Agency Problem I, is measured
as overhead expense over prime operating revenue.11 We expect that, if family shareholders intensify Agency Problem II (I)
relative to other large shareholders, then family control strengthens the negative relationship between the level of funds occu-
pation (overhead expense ratio) and cash dividend payments.12 We then empirically test the role that agency conﬂicts and the
institutional environment play in the relationship between family control and cash dividend policy, and present the results
in Tables 9 and 10.
Table 9 shows that Accratio is negatively associated with cash dividend payments (Cdumdiv, Cpayout, and Cdyield), but
that family control does not strengthen this association, as the regression coefﬁcients of the interaction term (Family  Acc-
ratio) are not signiﬁcant. This indicates that a high level of funds occupation does not provide a sufﬁciently powerful expla-
nation for the relatively passive cash dividend policy of family ﬁrms. Note that a favorable institutional environment helps to
alleviate the negative effect of funds occupation on cash dividend payments, as the regression coefﬁcients of Market  Acc-
ratio and Invest  Accratio are signiﬁcantly positive at the 10% level in all models. However, this corporate governance effect
of the institutional environment does not differ between family ﬁrms and non-family ﬁrms, because the signs of Fam-
ily  Accratio Market and Family  Accratio  Invest are insigniﬁcant. Clearly, it is possible that the institutional environ-
ment exerts a positive impact on the payout policy of family ﬁrms by some means other than by lowering the costs of
Agency Problem II.
Table 10 presents evidence that the cost of Agency Problem I (Msr) is negatively related to the cash dividend payout ratio
and propensity to pay dividends, and that family control enhances this negative relationship, as the regression coefﬁcients on
Family Msr are signiﬁcantly negative at the 10% level in almost all of the regressions. Remarkably, these results mean that
family control does not necessarily bring about positive governance, but rather intensiﬁes Agency Problem I and has a neg-
ative impact on corporate dividend policy. In addition, although a favorable institutional environment cannot mitigate the
negative effect of the costs of Agency Problem I on cash dividend policy for all companies, because the regression coefﬁcients
of Market Msr and Invest Msr are all insigniﬁcant, it does have an outstanding governance effect on family ﬁrms, as the
coefﬁcient on Family Msr Market and Family Msr  Invest are all signiﬁcantly positive.
We argue that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem I rather than Agency Problem II,
and have a signiﬁcant negative impact on cash dividend policy, whereas a favorable regional institutional environment plays
a positive role in corporate governance in helping to mitigate Agency Problem I and encouraging family ﬁrms to pay cash
dividends.9 Although there are certain limitations in investigating Agency Problem II in family ﬁrms from just this perspective, it is unrealistic for this study to examine
all possible kinds of tunneling by large shareholders.
10 Jiang and Yue (2005) ﬁnd that funds occupation is an important way for large shareholders to tunnel funds away from minority shareholders, noting that
funds occupation by large shareholders is usually the main component of other accounts receivables. Following Jiang and Yue (2005), Xia (2008) and Wang
et al. (2009), we employ the level of other accounts receivables as the proxy for Agency Problem II in China.
11 Ang et al. (2000) adopt the expense ratio (operating expenses scaled by annual sales) and the asset utilization ratio (annual sales divided by total assets) as
proxies for the costs of Agency Problem I. However, Song and Han (2005) and Zhang et al. (2008) argue that the expense ratio is not closely related toagency
costs, and use the overhead expense ratio and asset utilization ratio as measurements. Note that theasset utilization ratio is to some extent determined by the
size of ﬁrm, operational risk and industry characteristics, among others, whereas the overhead expense ratio captures managerial efﬁciency relative to non-
pecuniary compensation andperquisites. Wethus employ the overhead expense ratio as the proxy for the costs of Agency Problem I. The top and bottom 1% of
Accratio and Msr are winsorized to minimize the inﬂuence of outliers.
12 In fact, the group test results show that the mean (median) of Accratio is 0.125 (0.038) and 0.064 (0.021) for family ﬁrms and non-family ﬁrms, respectively.
Moreover, the mean (median) of Msr is 0.178 (0.081) for family ﬁrms and 0.111 (0.070) for non-family ﬁrms. In other words, the level of funds occupation by
large shareholders and the overhead expense ratio are both higher in family ﬁrms than in non-family ﬁrms.
Table 11
Two characteristics of ultimate control rights in family ﬁrms, non-family control and cash dividend policy.
N Cdumdiv Cpayout Cdyield
(A) Descriptive statistics (mean)
(1) Famboard 892 0.41816 0.17277 0.00605
(2) NonFamboard 768 0.24869 0.09881 0.00338
(3) Dlist 816 0.45343 0.19288 0.00667
(4) NonDlist 837 0.23178 0.08675 0.00305
(5) Non-Family 4661 0.50912 0.25497 0.00936
(B) Statistical tests
t-Test (1) vs. (5) 4.988*** 4.577*** 6.480***
(2) vs. (5) 13.619*** 8.368*** 11.137***
(3) vs. (5) 2.937*** 3.307*** 5.037***
(4) vs. (5) 15.110*** 9.420*** 12.289***
⁄ Signiﬁcance at the 10% levels (two-tailed).
⁄⁄ Signiﬁcance at the 5% (two-tailed).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% (two-tailed).
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of agency conﬂicts in family ﬁrms: whether family members participate in management (Famboard and NonFamboard)13 and
whether a family ﬁrm is listed by IPO (Dlist and NonDlist).14 Table 11 reports the main descriptive statistics and results of the
t-tests. According to agency theory, ﬁrms managed by family members or listed by IPO should have a lower Agency Problem I
but a higher Agency Problem II. Table 11 shows that cash dividends are lower for all four types of family ﬁrms relative to
non-family ﬁrms. In particular, the cash dividends of family ﬁrms that are not managed by family members (NonFamboard)
or that go public through a reverse merger (NonDlist) are less than half those of non-family ﬁrms. Comparatively speaking,
there are smaller differences in payout policies between family ﬁrms managed by family members (Famboard) or listed by
IPO (Dlist) and non-family ﬁrms. These results suggest that family control does not sharply reduce cash dividend payments in
family ﬁrms that face Agency Problem II, that is, Famboard and Dlist ﬁrms, and further that paying cash dividends is not a
priority for family ﬁrms confronted with Agency Problem I, that is NonFamboard and NonDlist ﬁrms.
In short, Table 11 conﬁrms our earlier ﬁnding that Agency Problem I rather than Agency Problem II has a greater negative
impact on the corporate cash dividend policy of family ﬁrms. From the perspective of agency theory, somewhat surprisingly,
the ‘‘entrenchment effect’’ due to the role of insiders, which in family ﬁrms constitute controlling family shareholders, rather
than the role of tunneling, explains why family ﬁrms have a more passive cash dividend policy than non-family ﬁrms.154.6. Robustness tests
In this section, we conduct several robustness tests.16 First, we use an alternative deﬁnition of family ﬁrms. Our main
empirical analysis is based on a deﬁnition of family ﬁrms that does not require a minimum threshold for family ownership.
In accordance with Miller et al. (2007), Maury (2006) and La Porta et al. (1999), we also employ stricter deﬁnitions of family
ﬁrms that require controlling family shareholders to hold at least 5%, 10% or 20% of the ownership of the company, respec-
tively, and our main results remain unchanged. Second, we use an alternative institutional environment index. Fan et al.
(2007) report the regional marketization index for China’s provinces up to 2005 only, so we use the index for 2005 to rep-
resent the institutional environment of various provinces over the sample period. The results are robust. Additionally, fol-
lowing Amit et al. (2009), we use the dummy variable Genv to measure regional institutional efﬁciency, which equals 1 if
the value of Market (Invest) of the province in which the ﬁrm is headquartered is high, and 0 if it is low. We repeat all of
the regressions and ﬁnd that the results are consistent with the main results. Third, we re-analyze the subsamples by run-
ning the regressions only on subsamples from 2004 and 2005 because of the missing regional marketization index after
2006, and obtain consistent results. Fourth, we conduct panel data analysis to control for the impact of unobservable factors
on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. We adopt unbalanced panel data models to estimate the logistic and Tobit
regressions, and our main results do not change. Fifth, we use an alternative method to control for the incentive to meet reg-
13 In fact, the chairman and vice-chairmen of a company do manage daily operations in China (Research Center of Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2005). We thus
consider them and managers to be company leaders. If one or more family members hold a leading position in a family ﬁrm, then Famboard equals 1, and 0
otherwise. However, if no family members hold a leading position in a family ﬁrm, then NonFamboard equals 1, and 0 otherwise. We hand collect this
information from the annual reports of the listed companies, internet search engines such as Google and Baidu, and news reports.
14 Dlist is set to 1 if the family ﬁrm is listed by IPO, and 0 otherwise. NonDlist is set to 1 if the family ﬁrm goes public through a reverse merger, and 0
otherwise. This data is collected from the CSMAR database and is selectively compared with the information disclosed in annual reports.
15 Remarkably, agency theory does not fully explain why family ﬁrms are less willing to pay cash dividends, because the cash dividends of family ﬁrms
managed by family members or listed by IPO are also signiﬁcantly lower than those of non-family ﬁrms. Wei (2010) provides a possible explanation from the
perspective of ﬁnancing constraints, suggesting that family ﬁrms usually face higher ﬁnancial constraints. Wei further explains why various types of family
ﬁrms pay lower cash dividends than non-family ﬁrms, arguing that agency theory combined with the ﬁnancial constraints hypothesis provides a relatively
complete and reasonable explanation for the relatively passive dividend policy of family ﬁrms.
16 Detailed results of the robustness tests are not reported due to space limitations.
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that involved an SEO in the period 2005–2009, and the results conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings. Finally, we address the endoge-
neity problem. Family ﬁrms are more likely to be located in the more advanced coastal areas of China, where ﬁrms have more
investment opportunities and are inclined to invest, rather than distribute cash dividends. Obviously, this may also explain
the lower cash dividend payments of family ﬁrms. To address this endogeneity problem, and following Amit et al. (2009), we
use a two-stage approach to estimate several treatment effects models. In the ﬁrst stage, a probit model is used to predict
Family by regressing it on Market (Invest), Size, Roa, Lev, Tobin’s Q, Cash, Lnage, and Dumroe, to produce a new dummy Fam-
predict that denotes family control. In the second stage, we use Fampredict to substitute for Family in testing Hypothesis 1.
The results show that Fampredict is negatively and signiﬁcantly associated with Cdumdiv, Cpayout, and Cdyield at the 10%
level in all of the regressions, indicating that our results are not driven by endogeneity.5. Conclusion
As an internal corporate governance mechanism, family control plays an important role in corporate behavior, but the
external institutional environment, such as the speed of marketization and the investment climate, also has a profound effect
on company decisions. Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004–2008, this study empir-
ically tests the impact of family control, institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed
companies. Our results show that family ﬁrms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than
non-family ﬁrms, and that a favorable regional institutional environment has a signiﬁcant positive impact on the cash div-
idend payout ratio and the propensity to pay dividends of listed companies. We also document that the impact of the regio-
nal institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family ﬁrms than in non-family ﬁrms. Additionally, we ﬁnd
that controlling family shareholders in China seem to intensify Agency Problem I rather than Agency Problem II, which
has a signiﬁcant negative impact on cash dividend policy. In contrast, a favorable regional institutional environment plays
a positive corporate governance role by helping to mitigate Agency Problem I and encouraging family ﬁrms to pay cash
dividends.
This study has theoretical and practical signiﬁcance for research on the corporate governance effects of family control and
the external environment. The empirical results show that different kinds of large shareholders may have heterogeneous
preferences for corporate cash dividend policy, with family shareholders avoiding paying high cash dividends, a favorite
method of turning untradeable shares into cash among other types of large shareholders in China. Somewhat surprisingly,
we also ﬁnd that family control intensiﬁes Agency Problem I rather than reducing it. This result is particularly relevant for
future guidelines and regulation governing agency issues in family ﬁrms. Finally, we suggest that a high cash dividend pay-
out is most likely the ‘‘outcome model’’ of a favorable regional institutional environment. This study thus provides important
evidence to further promote marketization reforms and improve the regional institutional environment in China.
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